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Institutional Investors, Real Earnings Management and Cost of 
Equity: Evidence from Listed High-tech Firms in China 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the association between real earnings management 
and the cost of equity from the perspective of the heterogeneity of 
institutional investors. Based on a sample of publicly listed high-tech firms 
in China from 2008 to 2017, our empirical results suggest that there is a 
significant negative correlation between earnings management and the cost 
of equity capital. This finding is contrary to Kim and Sohn’s (2013) 
conclusion, indicating that, in China, real earnings management cannot be 
effectively identified by external investors, and the company could easily 
obtain financing from the capital market and reduce its cost of equity due to 
its masked excellent performance by manipulating the real earnings 
management. Furthermore, we find that compared with transient 
institutional investors, stable institutional investors with the intention of 
holding the stock for the long-term can effectively reduce the cost of equity. 
Our results also show that real earnings management under the supervision 
of stable institutional investors could be more easily identified by 
shareholders and stable institutional investors could diminish the impact of 
earnings management on the cost of equity. 
 
JEL: G31 G32 
Key words: Institutional Investors; Earnings Management; Cost of Equity; High-tech 
enterprises 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management is defined as judgement exercised by managers in financial 
reporting to adjust financial reports. This behavior will mislead stakeholders' 
judgement of the company's performance and will also affect potential investors' 
investment judgment (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) and finally influence companies’ cost 
of equity. Previous studies indicate that managers’ concerns about current 
performance motivate them to engage in manipulating current period earnings at the 
expense of future period earnings (Stein, 1989; Fudenburg and Tirole, 1995; Pauwels 
et al., 2004; Graham et al., 2005; Rodriguez-Perez and Van Hemmen, 2010). As 
external investors and analysts typically form their expectations based on future 
earnings, in most cases, a variety of contractual obligations (e.g., earnings-based 
bonus contracts and debt covenants) are linked to current period reported earnings. 
This often leads to managerial myopia in which the managers are overly concerned 
with boosting current performance, such as stock prices. Thus managers have 
incentives to inflate current earnings by borrowing future earnings for use in the 
current period so that the operation performance could be affected by the upward 
trend and the managers with stock-based compensation could benefit from their own 
soaring shares. Therefore, external investors are often misled by current earnings 
profits, overconfident in masked excellent performance, and mistakenly regard the 
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companies as ‘white horse stocks’ or value investments, thus reducing the expected 
return on investment. Because of its masked excellent performance by manipulating 
the real earnings management, the company can easily obtain financing from the 
capital market and reduce its cost of equity. This finding leads to our first prediction 
that earnings management has a negative association with the cost of capital. 
Due to the imperfect regulations of the Chinese capital market system and the 
low-level protection for individual investors, this type of earnings management 
behavior is usually found in Chinese listed companies to avoid reporting losses (Wang, 
2005). In light of the adverse effects of earnings management, a large number of 
scholars have studied the relationship between institutional investors and earnings 
management. Chung et al. (2002), Cheng (2006), Gao and Zhang (2008) find that the 
proportion of institutional investors' shareholding is negatively correlated with the 
degree of earnings management. This finding indicates that institutional investors 
could effectively inhibit the management of earnings management behavior , but these 
studies are limited by a lack of empirical samples. Additionally, their conclusions are 
limited because institutional investors were found mainly in the initial stage during 
that period in China. With the prosperity of the Chinese capital market, the 
development of institutional investors began to diversify. Based on the endogenous 
perspective, Mei and Zhang (2016) find that compared with other institutional 
investors, securities investment funds have a significant inhibitory effect on earnings 
management behavior of their shareholding companies, and they are the dominant 
force in institutional investors to participate in corporate governance. Nevertheless, in 
the background of the imperfect governance structure of listed companies in China, 
whether institutional investors undertake short-term speculation to obtain capital gains 
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or make long-term investment to support the development of enterprises to obtain 
dividends has an increasingly overwhelming impact on the cost of equity on the 
capital market.  
In brief, this paper investigates the hitherto unexplored questions of whether real 
earnings management(hereafter REM) activities influence a firm’s cost of 
equity(hereafter CoE) based on the high-tech companies listed in China, all else being 
equal. We are motivated to test the relationship between REM and CoE, because the 
cost of equity is a key factor reflecting the expected return for the outside investors, 
and it even determines all social resource allocation decisions. We find a contrary 
conclusion to Kim and Sohn’s (2013) that REM is negatively associated with the cost 
of capital in China because REM is more difficult for investors to understand, and is 
normally less subject to monitoring and scrutiny by auditors, regulators and other 
outside stakeholders. This finding implies that in China, these REM activities could 
have direct influences on cash flow from business activities, thus the other external 
stakeholders and potential investors could be deceptive and decide to invest based on 
the masked financial report, which leads to a decrease in the investors’ expected 
return. Second, from the perspective of institutional investors, we examine whether a 
firm’s cost of equity will be influenced by institutional investor heterogeneity by 
comparing the impact of real earnings management behavior on the cost of equity 
capital for the two different institutional investor types at the same time. We find that 
real earnings management under the supervision of the stable institutional investors 
could be more easily identified by shareholders. Stable institutional investors could 
diminish the earnings management’s impact on the cost of equity. 
The contributions of this paper relative to previous research are listed below. 
First, the previous literature on institutional investor measurement is based on 
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different types of institutional investors, such as securities funds, QFII, insurance 
companies and social security funds in China. This paper examines the impact of the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors by dividing investors into stable and 
transactional institutional investors, also paying attention to the response of earnings 
management on the cost of equity under the stable institutional investors group and 
transient institutional investors group respectively, demonstrating the importance of 
stable institution investors’ role from another point of view. Second, most Chinese 
scholars tend to choose the absolute value of discretionary accruals (DA) to measure 
earnings management, but few studies have explored the relationship between real 
earnings management (REM) and the cost of equity capital. Based on the panel data 
model, this paper studies the association between real earnings management and the 
cost of equity in high-tech enterprises from the perspective of institutional investors 
and we find a contrary conclusion to that of Kim and Sohn’s (2013). In addition, the 
samples in this paper based on high-technology enterprises have special significance 
for the pratical value of financing strategy selection and the selection of institutional 
investors for high-tech enterprises in the ten key high-tech manufacturing industries 
for the Made in China 2025 initiative 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
review of the related literature and hypotheses. Section 3 provides details about the 
research design and sample selection procedure and develops our model. Section 4 
presents our empirical findings. Section 5 contains the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Real Earnings Management 
In the literature, many studies (Francoeur et al.,2012; Datta et al., 2013; Chiu, et 
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al.,2013; Kangarluei et al., 2011; Essid, 2012; Caton et al.,2011; He et al., 2011 
Degeorge et al., 2013; Hansen, 2010; Liu et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2014) related to 
earnings management focus only on identifying related factors that can significantly 
affect earnings management. However, these factors have not been used directly to 
forecast the level of earnings management in advance (Tsai & Chiou, 2009). 
Previous research has also examined earnings management by considering the 
decomposition of total accruals into their abnormal and discretionary components 
(Louis, 2004; Matsumoto, 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; Jones, 1991; Dechow, et 
al.,1995; Liu et al.,2014; Patro and Pattanayak, 2014; Greiner, 2015). The 
conventional earnings management (i.e., linear accrual) models assume that the slope 
coefficients are constant within the sample, which means that observations in the 
sample have a uniform accrual-generating process (Bartov et al., 2000). If an accrual 
model estimates the coefficients within the same industry, it assumes that firms in the 
same industry have similar accrual-generating processes (Wu, 2014). However, the 
uniform accrual-generating process assumption may not be proper for firms with 
extreme performance within the industry, leading to biased discretionary accrual 
estimates (Wu, 2014). 
To help investors in the stock market, it is necessary to develop a model that can 
predict the level of earnings management. Methods for predicting earnings 
management have been extensively researched. Classical statistical techniques 
influence the formation of these models, such as neural networks (Tsai & Chiou,2009; 
Hoglund, 2012; Pourhasan & Mansour,2014); decision trees (Tsai & Chiou,2009); 
and Benford's Law (Lin & Wu, 2014). 
Current period reported earnings can be managed in two different ways. First, 
managers can manipulate reported earnings through discretionary accrual choices that 
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are allowed under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). This 
within-GAAP discretionary accruals earnings management (hereafter DA) typically 
occurs at the end of an accounting period, after the completion of the most real 
operating activities. However, discretionary accruals earnings management (DA) has 
no direct effect on cash flows because it only influences the amount of accounting 
accruals directly. Second, managers can also manipulate reported earnings by 
distorting real activities. Specifically, they can alter the timing and scale of real 
activities such as production, sales, investments, and financing activities throughout 
the accounting period to meet a specific earnings target. For example, reported 
earnings can be temporarily boosted by accelerating the timing of production and 
sales schedules, by cutting discretionary expenditures, and by deferring the timing of 
their occurrences. According to Roychowdhury (2006), these real operation 
management activities that deviate from normal business practices with the primary 
objective of manipulating current period earnings are referred to as real earnings 
management (hereafter REM). Unlike DA, REM has direct consequences on current 
and future cash flows (as well as accounting accruals), which is more difficult for 
average investors to understand and normally less subject to monitoring and scrutiny 
by boards, auditors, regulators, and other outside stakeholders. This behavior  may 
misguide investors regarding the required rate of return on investment projects, which 
reflects the cost of equity in the capital market, or worse, a mismatch of social 
resources. 
2.2 Relationship between Real Earnings Management (REM) and the Cost of Equity 
Kim and Sohn (2013) first predict that the cost of capital is positively associated with 
the extent of REM activities aimed at earnings manipulation, arguing that REM 
activities increase the cost of equity for two major reasons. First, REM introduces 
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noise into reported earnings because noise affects accruals in addition to distorting 
cash flow through real operations-manipulating activities. Second, REM is typically 
seldom subject to external monitoring or scrutiny and is difficult to detect using 
internal monitors such as a board or audit committee. As a result, REM might not be 
curtailed by a good governance mechanism (Jaggi et al., 2009), thereby rendering 
external investors’ evaluation of firm performance more difficult. Thus, managers can 
misappropriate more cash if their firms’ true performance is masked by REM. This 
managerial opportunism causes outside investors to assess the expected level of future 
cash flows to be lower for REM-intensive firms, all else being equal. 
However, the structure of investors in the Chinese capital market is defective; 
more than half of investors are individual investors who are more likely to be 
deceived by masked current performance and make blind investments. Additionally, 
institutional investors do not make in-depth research and earnings forecasts, and the 
herding effect is prominent. Kangmei Pharmaceutical Co, a listed high-tech 
pharmaceutical company in China, committed the financial crime of fabricating more 
than 29.9 billion bank deposits in its bank accounts from fiscal year 2016 to 2018, and 
external auditing institutions did not audit cash management problems during the 
previous three years, directly leading to serious losses in financial performance in the 
2018 annual report. The annual reports for three consecutive years show that there 
were many well-known investment institutions among their shareholders. Although it 
is a type of fraud that makes the performance grow steadily, rather than earnings 
management implemented on cash flow, it proves that in China, it is difficult for 
external investors to evaluate companies’ real performance through their financial 
reports. External investors are often misled by current earnings profits, overconfident 
in masked excellent performance, and mistakenly regard the company as ‘white horse 
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stocks’, thus reducing the expected return on investment. Because of its masked 
excellent performance, a company can easily obtain financing from the capital market 
and reduce its cost of equity. This finding leads to our prediction that REM has a 
negative association with the cost of capital, as follows: 
H1: Earnings management through REM activity manipulation is significantly 
negatively related to CoE. 
2.3 Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors refer to financial institutions that maximize the benefits of 
capital management with more advantages in terms of professionals, scale, the ability 
to collect information, and more motivation to suppress corporate earnings 
management compared with individual investors. (Almazan et al., 2005; Chung and 
Zhang, 2011). As financial institutions and market mechanisms in the Chinese stock 
market is still immature, with insider trading, speculative investment behavior, and 
information asymmetry problems (Ding, Kim, and Zhang 2018),these institutional 
investors tend to release effective signals through buying and selling stocks, 
publishing research reports and investing ideas, which will attract the attention of 
individual shareholders and potential investors and ultimately affect the value of 
shareholding companies (Shi and Tong, 2009). However, most of the existing studies 
test the impact of institutional investors on earnings management based on the 
institutional investors' shareholding ratio, while the index of institutional investors' 
shareholding ratio cannot fully indicate the impact of institutional investors' stock 
ownership on the cost of equity capital through earnings management, since the index 
neglects the other factors beyond the dimension of the level of ownership. (Li et al, 
2014). 
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The study on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance has 
bloomed over the past twenty years. Research has shown that the role of institutional 
investors depends on the period of investment by institutional investors (Bushee, 2001; 
Gaspar et al., 2005). Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors into three 
categories: (1) transient institutional investors who hold diversified portfolios with 
high turnover rates; (2) dedicated institutional investors who hold concentrated 
portfolios with low turnover; and (3) quasi-indexers who hold diversified portfolios 
with low turnover. Bushee (2001) finds that only transient -–  but not long-term -– 
institutional investors exhibit a preference for near-term earnings. These findings 
support the concerns that many managers have about the adverse effects of an 
ownership base dominated by short-term-focused (transient) institutional investors. 
Liu and Xu (2012) find that short-term institutional investors' transaction changes lead 
to the intensification of market volatility, and that long-term stable institutional 
investors play a certain role in stabilizing the market. The empirical result is 
consistent with our paper’s opinion that institutional investors’ choice between 
supervision and a short-term trading strategy is mainly determined by the stability of 
institutional investors. 
2.4 Relationship among Institutional Investors, Earnings Management, and the Cost 
of Equity 
Ping-Sheng Koh (2007) tests the relationship between institutional investors and the 
company's arbitrary earnings management by manipulating the accrued profit and 
finds that the stable institutional investors will restrict the management of earnings, 
while the number of speculative investors in the trading institutions does not have a 
systematic connection with excessive earnings management. Instead, they are more 
likely to earn a trading interest margin through frequent transactions. Shi and Tong 
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(2009) find that the higher the proportion of institutional investors is, the higher the 
value of the enterprise is, and in the later period of the reform, the impact of 
institutional investors on the value of the enterprise has been significantly increased. 
Niu (2013) finds that institutional investors make less earnings by controlling 
ownership than other types of investors, so they pay more attention to the value of the 
enterprise. As a result of attempting to avoid weak performance, managers may have a 
greater incentive to exaggerate their earnings, show higher growth rates, increase 
stock prices and make investors more favourable to the business, leading to reducing 
the cost of equity. Therefore, we predict that institutional investors could exert the 
role of external governance to reduce the CoE and that stable institutional investors 
are more likely to diminish REM’s impact on the CoE than transient investors. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2: Institutional investors are significantly negatively related to CoE, and stable 
institutional investors are more likely than transient investors to diminish the REM’s 
impact on the CoE. 
3. Methodology 
Devesh Verma, Anant Mishra and Kingshuk K. Sinha (2010) take American high-tech 
enterprises as examples to illustrate that high-tech enterprises manipulate their 
accounting information by manipulating the real earnings management of R&D to 
achieve their performance goals. Daniel Olausson and Christian Berggren (2010) find 
that the uncertainty of management and the risk of development on innovation 
products motivate high-tech enterprises to use certain earnings management 
techniques to achieve their performance goals, and to exert certain impact on 
accounting information users. These unique characteristics of high-tech enterprises 
make them new targets for investors and creditors. Further, the problem of resource 
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allocation between traditional industries and high-tech industry has become 
particularly prominent since China proposed an innovation-driven development 
strategy to encourage high-tech enterprises. China has promulgated the recognition 
criteria of "Measures for the Identification and Management of High-tech Enterprises" 
(No. 32 Document published by Chinese National Science and Technology Focus 
[2016])1, which can help high-tech companies obtain income tax relief; that is, the tax 
for high-tech enterprises is levied at 15% compared with the normal 25% income tax 
in China. The government offers those special tax incentives to high-tech enterprises 
to promote the comprehensive and healthy development of high-tech industries. This  
also provides a tax incentive that managers are more likely to implement earnings 
management to meet the benchmark and to obtain tax relief in China (note 1 referred 
above) from another perspective. 
Therefore, we believe that it is necessary to conduct a unique study with this 
sample. In this paper, we finally find more than one thousand high-tech enterprises in 
accordance with No. 32 Document published by the Chinese National Science and 
Technology Focus in 2016 and we select 2008-2017 financial data for relevant 
collation. The data are collected from all companies publicly traded on China's 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from the CSMAR database, Wind database 
and related annual reports. In this article, the samples collected from the 2008-2017 
annual financial reports of high-technology enterprises exclude companies with the 
                                                 
1 One of the Standards of Measure for the Identification and Management of High-tech 
Enterprises is that the proportion of total research and development expenditure divided by 
total sales income over the past three years must meet the following requirements: 
1. If sales revenue is less than 50 million yuan in recent years, the proportion is not less than 
5%. 
2. If sales revenue is from 50 million yuan to 200 million yuan in recent years, the proportion 
is not less than 4%. 
3. If sales revenue is more than 200 million yuan in recent years, the proportion is not less 
than 3%. 
Among them, the total R&D expenditure incurred by enterprises in China accounts for no less 
than 60% of the total R&D expenditure. 
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absence of annual reports and ST companies to render the results more academic and 
objective. After the above screening, 7453 records were obtained. 
3.1 Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity financing refers to the minimum risk-adjusted rate of return that the 
company must earn to meet the requirements of shareholders or investors. We use the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the cost of capital. The equilibrium 
yield of the risk asset is a function of the covariance (beta coefficient) of the market 
combination rate of return. The yield of the asset is equal to the risk-free interest rate 
plus the risk premium determined by the systematic risk. The formula of the asset 
pricing model is as follows: 
 𝑅𝑠 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) (1) 
Based on the work of Jiang (2006, 2008) and other studies, this article uses CAPM to 
calculate the company's equity financing costs where Rf, the risk-free rate of return, 
is the average interest rate of the longest term treasury bonds traded on the Shanghai 
stock exchange and β is the systematic risks for companies; additionally, the market 
annual yield is the total monthly average return (total market value weighted average 
method) considering cash dividends reinvestment multiplied by 12. 
3.2 Real Earnings Management 
Roychowdhury (2006) developed empirical models for estimating the typical levels of 
real business activities, as reflected in the cash flow from operations, production costs, 
and discretionary expenditures. We use equation 2 to estimate the absolute value of 
it to measure the abnormal level. 















where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the cash flow from operations of company i for year t; 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is the 
assets of company i for year t-1; 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡is the sales for year t; and ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the 
change in sales of company i for year t; 
In table 1, according to the equation of Roychowdhury's model, we multiply the 
two sides of the equation by the assets and perform the regression to obtain the 
coefficient and the residual. We take the absolute value of the residual division asset 
as the measure of real earnings management. 
Table 1 
Regressions of real earnings management based on Roychowdhury (2006) 
Variables Coef. p>|t| 
SALE 0.0099284*** 0.000 
△SALES 0.1089522*** 0.000 
Intercept 1.21E+08*** 0.000 
Adjusted R² 0.930  
F 383.02*** 0.0000 
Notes: 
itSALES  is the sales for year t; itSALES  is the change in sales for year t; 
1− itSALES  is the change in sales for year t-1; according to the equation of 
Roychowdhury's model, we multiply the two sides of the equation by the assets, and 
perform the regression to obtain the coefficient, as well as residuals. We take the 
absolute value of the residual division asset as the measure of real earnings 
management. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level 
 
3.3 Heterogeneity of Institutional Investors 
With reference to the practice of Elyasiani and Jia (2008), Niu Jianbo (2013) and Li 
Zhengguang (2015), this paper uses industry and time to measure the heterogeneity of 
institutional investors. 
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The formula is as follows: 
 
{
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡/𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡−3, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡−2, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 = {




Among these values, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡 represents the institutional investor shareholding 
ratio of enterprise i in year t; 𝑆𝑇𝐷(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡−3, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡−2, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑡−1) indicates the 
standard deviation of institutional investor ownership in the former three-year 
financial reports; 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡  represents the heterogeneity of institutional investors 
(measured by the time dimension); 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡) represents the middle position 
of industry j of 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡  in year t; and 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable, indicating that 
the heterogeneity of institutional investors is measured from the industry dimension. 
When 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡) , 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡  is 1, indicating that institutional 
investors of enterprise i in year t are a stable type of long-term shareholding of the 
enterprise; otherwise, it is 0, which means institutional investors of enterprise i in year 
t is a short-term transient type. 
3.4 Control Variables 
Referring to the previous literature, this paper uses relevant explanatory variables as 
controls, listed as follows. The first is the size of the company (SIZE): the larger that 
the scale of the company is, the more that external investors focus on the value of the 
enterprise, which can affect the financing cost of the enterprise. Among them, the size 
of the enterprise is generally measured by the natural logarithm of the total assets of 
the accounting year. The second is leverage (LEV): judging the corporate debt 
situation and the index of capital structure, different leverage will cause the financial 
analysis indicators to become unbalanced, which will affect the return rate required by 
the investment enterprises of the external investors, that is, the cost of the equity 
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capital of the company. The measure is the total assets of the enterprise divided the 
total liabilities. The third is the total asset return (ROA): the net profit rate of the 
company is equal to the net profit after tax, divided by the total assets of the company. 
The empirical evidence shows that the total asset yield of the company is positively 
related to earnings management (Dechow, 1998). At the same time, the net profit 
margin of the company is considered by the overwhelming majority of institutional 
investors to assess the financial indicators of a company, which affects the rate of 
return required by the investor and reflects the cost of equity financing of the 
company. The market price ratio (MB) is the fair value of enterprises in the stock 
market divided by the enterprise’s book value as an alternative to Tobin’s Q. 
Empirical analysis shows that information asymmetry often occurs between the 
owners and corporate governance managers of high-technology enterprises 
(Ping-Sheng Koh, 2007), and asymmetrical information is caused by management to 
whitewash financial statements by manipulating the real earnings management of 
revenues and expenses. In addition, as a fast-growing company is considered a "white 
horse stock" with high growth in the capital market, it may cause an overvaluation of 
the stock price. To overestimate the value of the white horse stock, there may be a 
higher investment risk, so investors might ask for higher returns, which will affect the 
cost of equity capital. 
3.5 Model 
(1) The influence of earnings management on the cost of equity 
 CoE𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎6𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + +𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
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where CoE𝑖𝑡  represents the cost of equity. 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡  represents the earnings 
management measure of company i in year t, using the absolute value of 𝜀𝑖𝑡 to 
measure the abnormal level based on Roychowdhury (2006). 
(2) The influence of institutional investors and earnings management on the cost 
of equity capital. 
 CoE𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑏6𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏7𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(5) 
where CoE𝑖𝑡  represents the cost of equity.  𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡  represents the earnings 
management measure of company i in year t, using the absolute value of it to 
measure the abnormal level based on Roychowdhury (2006). 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 , a dummy, 
represents the heterogeneity of institutional investors. 
Table 2 Variables and their definition 
Variables Definition 
CoE Cost of capital, the dependent variable, estimated by the asset pricing 
model (CAPM)  
REM Real earnings management, estimated by the absolute value of it to 
measure the abnormal level based on Roychowdhury (2006) model 
INST A dummy variable representing the heterogeneity of institutional 
investors. 1 indicates that institutional investors of enterprise i in t year 
is a stable type of long-term shareholding of the enterprise; otherwise, it 
is 0 
SIZE Measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets 
ROA The net profit rate of the company is equal to the net profit after tax/the 
total assets 
MB Fair value of enterprise in the stock market divided by enterprise book 
value 
BETA Systematic risks 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows the industry distribution of the full sample, the sum of stable 
institutional investors and transient institutional investors and their proportion. 
According to the classification standard of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, the samples are categorized in table 3. Industry A stands for agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; B for mining; C for manufacturing; D for 
electricity, gas and water production and supply; E for construction; F for wholesale 
and retail trade; G for transportation, warehousing and postal services; I for 
information transmission, software and information technology services; J for finance; 
K for real estate; L for leasing and business services; M for scientific research and 
technology services; N for water conservancy, environment and public facilities 
management; R for culture, sports and entertainment; and S for integration. We easily 
find that high-tech companies are concentrated in manufacturing and information 
transmission, accounting for 81.83% and 9.83% of high-tech companies, respectively. 
In addition, the table shows that institutional investors are less than half of all 
institutional investors, indicating that more than half of the institutional investors tend 
to transact in the short term for capital gains in China. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of the heterogeneity of institutional investors: all samples 
  All samples Stable(long-term) investors Unstable(transient)investors 
A 41 0.55% 25 0.78% 16 0.38% 
B 60 0.81% 25 0.78% 35 0.83% 
C 6099 81.83% 2677 83.16% 3422 80.82% 
D 37 0.50% 5 0.16% 32 0.76% 
E 109 1.46% 44 1.37% 65 1.54% 
F 67 0.90% 28 0.87% 39 0.92% 
G 38 0.51% 4 0.12% 34 0.80% 
I 733 9.83% 307 9.54% 426 10.06% 
J 25 0.34% 8 0.25% 17 0.40% 
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K 18 0.24% 5 0.16% 13 0.31% 
L 63 0.85% 28 0.87% 35 0.83% 
M 66 0.89% 24 0.75% 42 0.99% 
N 67 0.90% 26 0.81% 41 0.97% 
R 17 0.23% 4 0.12% 13 0.31% 
S 13 0.17% 9 0.28% 4 0.09% 
Total 7453 100.00% 3219 100.00% 4234 100.00% 
Note: Table 3 shows the industry distribution of the full sample, the sum of 
stable institutional investors and transient institutional investors identified by equation 
3 and their proportion, respectively. According to the classification standard of the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, the samples are categorized in the table. 
Industry A stands for agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; B for mining; 
C for manufacturing; D for electricity, gas and water production and supply; E for 
construction; F for wholesale and retail trade; G for transportation, warehousing and 
postal services; I for information transmission, software and information technology 
services; J for finance; K for real estate; L for leasing and business services; M for 
scientific research and technology services; N for water conservancy, environment 
and public facilities management; R for culture, sports and entertainment; and S for 
integration. 
 
Table 4 panel A presents the descriptive statistical results for all samples. The 
statistical results show that among the 7453 selected sample observations, the average 
cost of equity financing measured by CAPM is 1.25%, which is lower than the yield 
of ten-year Treasury bonds. On the one hand, the market annual rate of return 
considering the monthly average rate of cash dividend reinvestment might be 
influenced by fluctuations in the Chinese securities market. On the other hand, the 
total fair value of most of the technology stocks is small, resulting in investors being 
keen to speculate and make blind investments, thus reducing the companies’ cost of 
financing. Real earnings management, which is measured by Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
absolute value model, is used as the measure of substantial earnings management in 
high-tech enterprises. The p50 level reaches 0.06%, and the average level reaches 
9.07%. According to the analysis of the characteristics of stable institutional investors 
and transactional institutional investors, it is found that the proportion of stable 
investors in high-tech enterprises is approximately 43%, showing that the current 
situation in China remains dominated by short-term transactions to obtain capital 
dividends; the control variables such as size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), net asset profit 
(ROA) and book-to-market ratio (MB) are in line with expectations except for a few 
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enterprises in several years. 
Table 4 panel B presents the descriptive statistical results for industry C, 
manufacturing, which will be used to perform the robustness test. 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics of all samples (panel A) and industry C (panel B) 
Panel A Obs Mean Max Min p25 p50 p75 SD 
CoE(%) 7453 1.252232 752.65 -314.247 -10.5558 2.95613 9.54521 29.51667 
INST 7453 0.431907 1 0 0 0 1 0.495375 
REM 7453 0.090689 11.2176 3.50E-06 0.027161 0.062388 0.115024 0.18968 
SIZE 7453 21.72304 27.4868 19.2372 20.9861 21.6215 22.3175 1.01281 
LEV 7453 0.371288 1.53259 0.007521 0.217154 0.361384 0.506495 0.193686 
ROA 7453 0.606523 0.599886 -1.31931 0.029804 0.055509 0.089161 0.067134 
MB 7453 4.219811 405.158 -91.7617 2.20312 3.24884 4.89196 8.184224 
BETA 7453 1.097339 32.2589 -23.6435 0.6169 1.1752 1.5881 1.194807 
Panel B Obs Mean Max Min p25 p50 p75 SD 
CoE(%) 6099 1.344376 752.65 -314.247 -10.5035 2.95705 9.58324 29.87136 
INST 6099 0.438924 1 0 0 0 1 0.496296 
REM 6099 0.081341 1.62382 1.10E-05 0.026105 0.059803 0.109577 0.086868 
SIZE 6099 21.75176 25.7436 19.2372 21.0276 21.6498 22.3391 0.99759 
LEV 6099 0.373292 1.53259 0.007521 0.220183 0.364706 0.507898 0.191737 
ROA 6099 0.061006 0.586342 -0.7809 0.02939 0.055363 0.089929 0.064762 
MB 6099 4.009353 347.078 -49.9771 2.1449 3.12656 4.72064 7.006032 
BETA 6099 1.095009 32.2589 -23.6435 0.6207 1.1736 1.5773 1.220353 
Note: Panel A in this table presents descriptive statistics for the major variables used 
in the full model sample. Panel B in this table presents descriptive statistics for 
manufactory for the major variables used in the model above. All the variables are 
defined in table 2. 
 
4.2 Empirical Test 
In this paper, by constructing unbalanced panel data, the following regression 
coefficient table is obtained in the following, while the Hausman test shows that they 
are consistent with the fixed effect. Table 5 shows that real earnings management is 
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significantly negatively correlated with the cost of equity capital. When REM changes 
one unit, it will affect the cost of equity by approximately -5.5%. Thus, when the 
earnings behavior  conducted by management reaches 1%, the financing cost of 
equity could be reduced by 0.055%, which indicates that the earnings management by 
key management in listed high-tech enterprises in China cannot be identified easily, 
which reduces the cost of equity capital and strongly supports H1. The results are also 
consistent with previous research showing that REM is more difficult to detect than 
DA and that REM activities are normally less subject to external monitoring or 
scrutiny. REM is also more difficult to detect by internal monitors, such as the board 
or audit committee. As a result, REM may not be curtailed by a good governance 
mechanism (Jaggi et al., 2009), thereby making external investors’ evaluation of firm 
performance more difficult. As a result, managers can misappropriate more cash if 
their firms’ true performance is masked by REM. This managerial opportunism causes 
outside investors to assess the expected level of future cash flows to be lower for 
REM-intensive firms, decreasing the investors’ expectation of return and reduces the 
cost of equity in China. In terms of control variables, BETA is significantly positively 
correlated with the cost of equity financing, indicating that the higher the systemic 
risk of the company, the higher the cost of equity. The size of the company is 
significantly positively correlated with the cost of equity financing, which shows that 
investors in China are keen to invest the listed high-tech companies with the small fair 
value, resulting in larger enterprises’ shares being seriously undervalued. This is 
because of that unlike the markets in developed countries, individual investors 
comprise the majority in the Chinese stock market and most of them are speculative 
investors who lack of investment knowledge (Jiang and Kim, 2015) and usually 
overestimate or underestimate and expect mismatched returns (Ma, Song and Zhang, 
2019). The asset-liability ratio LEV is significantly negatively correlated with the cost 
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of equity, showing that the high debt ratio has a negative impact on shareholders' 
returns, which also reflects that the debt behavior of listed companies in China 
remains in the passive debt stage; that is, listed companies do not take the initiative in 
debt financing to improve shareholders' returns. The company's book-to-book ratio 
(MB) is significantly positively correlated with the cost of equity, which indicates that 
as MB increases, the operational risk of these enterprises increases, resulting in a 
higher cost of equity. These findings are consistent with the research conducted by Ye 
and Lu (2004). The ROE of profitability is significantly positively correlated with the 
cost of equity financing, indicating that as the profitability of the company increases, 
the higher the expected return of shareholders and the higher the cost of equity. These 
findings are consistent with the research conducted by Jiang and Lu (2006). 
Table 5 
Regressions of the relationship between real earnings management and cost of 
equity 
Variables Coef. p>|t| 
REM -5.558223*** 0.002  
SIZE 3.056324*** 0.000  
LEV -5.972715*** 0.005  
ROA -15.6113*** 0.003  
MB 0.1621587*** 0.000  
BETA 4.477408*** 0.000  
Intercept -67.0694*** 0.000  
Adjusted R² 0.2483   
F 62.93*** 0.0000  
Note: Table 5 presents the regression results of model 4 with the coefficient and 
significance. All the variables are defined in table 2. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level 
From column 1 of table 6, we can see that the heterogeneity of institutional 
investors is significantly negatively correlated with the cost of equity capital, and it is 
significant at 1%. This finding shows that, compared with transactional institutional 
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investors, stable institutional investors can effectively reduce the cost of equity capital. 
H2 is verified. 
To verify the reliability of the conclusion, we divide the sample into two groups 
according to the heterogeneity of institutional investors: stable institutional investors 
and transient institutional investors, then we regress model 4 with the two groups of 
samples in columns 2 and 3 of table 6. The coefficient of REM is still significantly 
negatively related to CoE, and H1 is verified again. 
At the same time, we find that when REM changes one unit, the cost of equity 
will reduce approximately 2.38% under the constraint of stable institutional investors 
and 10.87% with transient institutional investors, both significant at the 1% level. 
This means that the earnings management under the supervision of the stable 
institutional investors could possibly be identified and could diminish the earnings 
management’s impact on the cost of equity, which confirms the role of stable 
institutional investors from another perspective. H2 is verified again. 
The relationship between the relevant control variables and the cost of equity is 
almost consistent with the conclusion obtained in table 5. 
Table 6 
Regressions of the relationship between real earnings management and cost of 
equity 
 All samples (1) INST =1 (2) INST =0 
Variables Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| 
REM -1.902177** 0.013  -2.381128*** 0.007 -10.8751*** 0.000 
INST -10.51712*** 0.000          
SIZE 3.076918*** 0.000  2.954472*** 0.000 2.947113*** 0.000 
LEV -5.580217*** 0.009  -3.240884 0.294 -7.371327** 0.012 
ROA -14.71788*** 0.005  -20.82576* 0.080 -3.580084 0.615 
MB 0.1617495*** 0.000  0.0659553 0.44 0.2396292*** 0.000 
BETA 4.485941*** 0.000  2.570523*** 0.000 7.405053*** 0.000 
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Intercept -66.74506*** 0.000  -63.43378*** 0.000 -67.40632*** 0.000 
Adjusted R² 0.2493   0.2323   0.2781   
F 48.21*** 0.0000  17.89*** 0.000 59.69*** 0.000 
Note: Table 6 column 1 (all samples) presents the regression results of model 5 with 
the coefficient and significance. Then, the samples are divided into two groups 
according to the heterogeneity of institutional investors (model 3): stable institutional 
investors and transient institutional investors and then we regress model 4 with the 
two groups of samples shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 6. All the variables are 
defined in table 2. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level 
 
4.3 Robustness Test 
4.3.1 Robustness test by 5th and 95th percentiles samples 
To avoid possible bias from extreme values, the study also adopts samples within the 
5th and 95th percentiles of all sample data as measures for the robustness test (Huang 
& Liu, 2011). The results are shown in table 7. Compared with tables 5 and 6, there is 
no essential change in the research results. Hypotheses 1, and 2 are verified again. 
Table 7 
Regressions of the relationship between real earnings management and cost of 
equity (from 5th to 95th percentile) 
  All samples All samples (1) INST =1 (2) INST =0 
Variables Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| 
REM -4.029841***  0.000  -.7997932* 0.078 -2.362696*** 0.007 -6.995338*** 0.000 
INST     -7.103781*** 0.000         
SIZE 1.799127***  0.000  1.783373*** 0.000 2.256799*** 0.000 2.013415*** 0.000 
LEV -0.8596142  0.507  -0.6890662 0.597 -1.571181 0.409 -2.263896 0.209 
ROA -8.131068***  0.011  -7.782916** 0.015 -22.20025*** 0.000 -2.870626 0.511 
MB 0.1067702***  0.000  0.1063747*** 0.000 0.5958941*** 0.000 0. 0671186** 0.017 
BETA 3.949983***  0.000  3.952756*** 0.000 3.040216*** 0.000 4.664038*** 0.000 
Intercept -40.84184***  0.000  -40.14465*** 0.000 -51.02141*** 0.000 -45.42152*** 0.000 
Adjusted R² 0.2703    0.2711   0.2649   0.2889   
F 84.39***  0.000 64.11*** 0.0000 33.85*** 0.000 61.23*** 0.000 
Note: Table 7 column 1 (all samples from 5th to 95th percentiles) presents the 
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regression results of model 4 with the coefficient and significance. Table 7 column 2 
(all samples from the 5th to 95th percentiles) presents the regression results of model 
5 with the coefficient and significance. Then, the samples are divided into two groups 
according to the heterogeneity of institutional investors (model 3): stable institutional 
investors and transient institutional investors and then we regress model 4 again with 
the two groups of samples shown in columns 3 and 4 of table 7. All the variables are 
defined in table 2. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level 
 
4.3.2 Robustness test by industry control  
Because most of the high-tech enterprises in this paper are distributed in the 
manufacturing industry classified by the SEC, we control the industry in 
manufacturing and regress the data from panel B in the table as measures for the 
robustness test. The results are shown in table 8. Compared with table 5 and table 6, 
there is no essential change in the research results. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are verified 
again. 
Table 8 
Regressions of the relationship between real earnings management and cost of 
equity (control the industry in manufacturing) 
 All samples in 
manufacturing 
All samples in manufacturing (1) INST =1 (2) INST =0 
Variables Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| Coef. p>|t| 
REM -18.90952***  0.000  -1.881434* 0.072 -9.223338 0.176 -24.41528*** 0.000 
INST     -23.7729*** 0.000         
SIZE 2.71483*** 0.00  2.76758*** 0.000 2.524876*** 0.000 2.605142*** 0.000 
LEV -7.326305  0.507  -7.047061*** 0.004 -3.849317*** 0.274 -9.069286*** 0.007 
ROA -18.16013**  0.011  -17.8785*** 0.004 -17.73794*** 0.050 -12.72815 0.128 
MB 0.1251913***  0.000  0.1229783** 0.024 -.2585259*** 0.006 0.29378** 0.017 
BETA 4.3035***  0.000  3.952756*** 0.000 2.48832*** 0.000 7.356467*** 0.000 
Intercept -57.54143***  0.000  -57.99608*** 0.000 -52.45908*** 0.000 -57.98091*** 0.000 
Adjusted R² 0.2460    0.2465   0.2318   0.2784   
F 48.91***  0.000 37.11*** 0.0000 14.63*** 0. 000 48.43*** 0.000 
Note: Table 8 column 1 (all samples in manufacturing) presents the regression results 
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of model 4 with the coefficients and significance. Table 8 column 2 (all samples in 
manufacturing) presents the regression results of model 5 with the coefficients and 
significance. Then, the samples are divided into two groups according to the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors (model 3): stable institutional investors and 
transient institutional investors and then model 4 is regressed again with the two 
groups of samples shown in columns 3 and 4 of table 8. All the variables are defined 
in table 2. 




This paper studies the relationship among institutional investors, real earnings 
management and the cost of equity capital of listed high-tech companies in China. 
Real earnings management has direct consequences on current and future cash flows, 
which is more difficult for average investors to understand, and this behavior  might 
misguide the investors on the required rate of return on investment projects. In 
addition, the recognition criteria of "Measures for the Identification and Management 
of High-tech Enterprises" (No. 32 Document published by Chinese National Science 
and Technology Focus [2016]) could help listed companies obtain income tax relief. 
This provides great motivation for managers to implement earnings management to 
meet the benchmark due to the special Chinese capital background. Therefore, we are 
motivated to test the relationship because the cost of equity is a key factor reflecting 
the expected return of the outside investors, even determining all social resource 
allocation decisions. Through the empirical analysis, we generate the following 
conclusions and put forward suggestions accordingly. 
First, the earnings management of the listed high-tech companies is negatively 
correlated with the cost of equity capital. This finding is contrary to Kim and Sohn’s 
(2013) conclusion, indicating that, in China, real earnings management cannot be 
effectively identified by external investors, and the company could easily obtain 
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financing from the capital market and reduce its cost of equity due to its masked 
excellent performance by manipulating the real earnings management. We 
recommend improving the quality of management and enhancing the sense of 
professional ethics of senior managers, which will greatly reduce real earnings 
management based on income and improve enterprises’ disclosure mechanism. 
Instead of managing earnings, managers of listed companies can actively disclose 
enterprise information to the outside capital market to build up the image of the 
company and to build trust with investors, which would also reduce the financing 
costs of equity. 
Second, compared with transactional institutional investors, stable institutional 
investors who intend to hold stock for long terms can effectively reduce the cost of 
equity capital. Real earnings management under the supervision of stable institutional 
investors could be more strongly identified, and the stable institutional investors could 
diminish the impact of earnings management on the cost of equity. Therefore, we 
strongly suggest that institutional investors play an active role in corporate 
governance. In the context of emerging markets, such as China, institutional investors 
can still influence managers' opportunistic behavior s and can have a positive impact 
on corporate value. Especially in the background of Chinese new economic policy, the 
introduction of long-term stable institutional investors is needed to promote the 
development of high-tech enterprises, which could improve the company’s external 
governance mechanism. 
There are, however, two shortcomings in this paper. The heterogeneity of 
institutional investors' shareholding is based on the static indicators disclosed in the 
annual report, but in fact, institutional investors' shareholding ratio could fluctuate 
within one year. Future research projects could focus on the impact of institutional 
investors' shareholding changes on earnings management behavior . In addition, when 
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using the CAPM model, the annual return rate of the market, which adopts the 
monthly average return rate of cash dividend reinvestment, fluctuates greatly in the 
Chinese stock market. Many studies have adopted the model of the cost of equity 
from the ex post model to the ex ante model, which inspires us to further study the 
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